UK Drone Incursions: Adversarial Threats and the UFO Connection
Liberation Times Opinion & Insight
Written by Franc Milburn - 10 December 2024
British and American responses to recent drone incursions at UK Royal Air Force (RAF) bases hosting and supporting nuclear-capable United States Air Force (USAF) units – widely reported in mainstream media, defence and regional outlets from late November – indicate likely adversarial activity.
Thus far, the USAF has not responded to Liberation times requests for additional clarification on concurrent drone or Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) activity, or whether suspects have been identified and apprehended, but the types of units deployed, the affected locations, base attractiveness to hostile actors, the drone activity, plus official statements with concurrent military activities, provide indications as to what may have taken place.
At least one prominent UAP researcher has posited a possible UAP angle and speculation about this has increased – given the potential presence of nuclear weapons – the platforms that deliver them and the historical UAP / nuke case at Rendlesham forest in 1980 and the 1956 Lakenheath-Bentwaters sightings.
Unfortunately, X / Twitter has been rife with misinformation and erroneous speculation, mostly due to accounts seeking to boost engagement.
I am not ruling out presence of more exotic technology or UAP, but rather attempting to put forward a more prosaic assessment in light of the information we do have.
My current assessment points to covert – plausibly deniable activity by a hostile actor – that is being taken very seriously by UK and U.S. authorities in the context of heightened international tensions.
At the same time, given the limited official or expert information available, one must keep an open mind and use logical deduction and context to determine the most likely explanation.
Assets And Bases Targeted
RAF Lakenheath, an RAF base used by USAF units – is a prime target for hostile intelligence services (and their proxies) activity. The Cold War era base – one of a sprawling network in East Anglia – hosts a strategically and operationally important USAF unit – the 48th Operations Group – which has four squadrons of F-35A and F-15E aircraft dedicated to operations for U.S. Air Forces Europe, U.S. European Command, NATO and also U.S. Africa Command.
Both aircraft types are capable of delivering the B61 nuclear bomb. F15E pilots from Lakenheath were recently decorated for actions intercepting Houthi and Iranian drones targeting Israel.
Significance: Russian President Vladimir Putin´s invasion of Ukraine, nuclear sabre-rattling, use of an ICBM against Ukraine, and re-writing of Russian nuclear doctrine has NATO concerned.
This has led to speculation over re-deployment of B61 nuclear bombs to the UK – specifically Lakenheath – coupled with certification of NATO partner aircraft for the nuclear delivery role. As such, Lakenheath and other U.S. and RAF bases in the UK will be prime targets for hostile foreign espionage and sabotage activity.
RAF Mildenhall: another RAF base used by USAF units. The base hosts the USAF 100th Air Refuelling Wing – a unit operationally and strategically vital to worldwide American and NATO missions, including nuclear strike, because aircraft can´t undertake extended flights without air-to-air refuelling.
Additionally, Mildenhall hosts the USAF´s 352nd Special Operations Wing which: “plans and performs specialized operations using advanced aircraft, tactics and air refuelling techniques to transport and resupply military forces. The wing also provides tilt-rotor aircraft aerial refuelling and special operations weather capabilities.”
A sub-unit is the 321st Special Tactics Squadron – a USAF Special Operations rapid deployment unit that provides Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, special reconnaissance, pararescue specialists and Special Operations weathermen. The unit undertakes reconnaissance, surveillance and creation of drop zones and tactical air landing sites. They also provide combat medical support and recovery of personnel and equipment.
It should be noted that this is the only USAF Special Operations unit located in Europe. As such, it could be tasked with UAP crash retrievals – given the assets available at Mildenhall, in Europe and the Spanish Canary Islands – that allow the unit to easily reach anywhere in Europe or Africa.
Significance: given the mission of the 100th to support tactical and potentially nuclear strikes by the F15E and F-35-equipped 48th Group, the 100th will be a prime target for hostile intelligence services seeking to understand American capabilities, organisation, locations, vulnerabilities and intentions.
Given the presence of USAF Special Operations units at Mildenhall – which operate from Europe to Africa – where Russian-controlled groups are engaged – means that the unit will be of high interest to hostile intelligence services.
In event of high intensity conflict with Russia, the 321st could be expected to operate deep inside Ukraine, potentially inside Russia and also forward combat areas like Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, Sweden and Norway.
RAF Feltwell: a non-flying base easily recognisable with its giant golf-ball radar domes, Feltwell provides housing for USAF personnel, educational facilities and a store, as well as hosting the 73rd Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron (ISR), U.S. Space Force – which is subordinate to Space Delta 7 – the operational ISR element of U.S. Space Force.
“ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] Delta provides critical, time sensitive and actionable intelligence for space domain operations to allow for the detection, characterization and targeting of adversary space capabilities. DEL 7 employs a variety of fixed and mobile sensors across the globe operated by ISR professionals to enable the United States Space Force to gain and maintain space superiority.”
Delta 7´s mission is to: “execute global ISR operations to gain and maintain information dominance in the space domain.” The stated mission of 73rd ISR at Feltwell is to conduct “global ISR operations to support the research, development and acquisition of future space capabilities.”
Significance: the base has strategic assets and highly trained personnel vital to monitoring of air and space. Additionally, targeting personnel who fly, fuel, arm, maintain, plan and otherwise support flying operations, can be just as important as targeting aircraft and are arguably softer targets. During the 1982 War, British Special Forces developed plans to destroy Exocet anti-ship missiles, the aircraft that carried them and the pilots who flew them.
RAF Marham: a British field located near the Lakenheath-Mildenhall-Feltwell base cluster, is home to 617 and 207 Squadrons, RAF, as well as 809 Naval Air Squadron, all operating F-35B. It is also headquarters for the Lightening Force, which overseas the UK´s F-35 program.
Protecting Marham are 15 Squadron RAF Regiment – infantry that provide force protection including dismounted close combat – and Number 6 RAF Police & Security Squadron (F35, that provides “dedicated policing, security and counter-intelligence effect in order to secure the F-35 Force and protect the F-35 platform, people and program in the UK and Overseas.”
Significance: Marham is vital for projection of British airpower, carrier air operations and the management of the UK´s F-35 fleet.
RAF Fairford: the USAF's only European heavy bomber airfield and home to the 420th Air Base Squadron. It was used by B-52s during the 2003 Iraq War, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the first Gulf War in 1991.
The base has also hosted U-2S Dragon Ladies from the 99th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron. Their mission is: “to employ high altitude Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to execute effective and sustained U-2 operations globally” and “responsible for providing critical intelligence for use by the highest levels of our [U.S.] government.”
Significance: Fairford is a strategically and operationally critical base for USAF heavy bombers as well as ISR. This will be of high intelligence interest to adversary intelligence, especially in the context of rising tensions with Russia over Ukraine and recent malign activities targeting NATO members.
U.S. and British activities: these indicate widespread concern with the drone or Unmanned Aerial System incursions and are what one would expect in the circumstances. Lord Coaker, UK Minister of State for Defence in the House of Lords reporting to the Secretary of Defence, announced a criminal investigation on 26 November in the Lords.
Lord Coaker stated:
“The Ministry of Defence is aware of these reports and working closely and working closely with the US visiting forces, Home Office police forces [non-MDP civil police] and other partners to respond to recent events. We will work with civil authorities to prosecute those responsible. We take any safety issue seriously and maintain robust measures at Ministry of Defence sites. This includes counter-drone capabilities. This remains a live criminal investigation.”
Lord Coaker has responsibility for the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) which provides armed policing and security for nuclear weapons, UK and US bases; intelligence support; prevention, detection and investigation of fraud, corruption and theft of or criminal damage to assets; tactical firearms and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response for UK bases.
Common to other UK police forces, the MDP has plainclothes Special Branch officers who investigate national security threats like: terrorism, organised crime, subversion and extremism, working with counter-intelligence (CI) and security agencies like MI5 and Defence Intelligence. The MDP works closely with two USAF Security Forces Squadrons, which provide military police and tactical capabilities, at Lakenheath and Mildenhall.
The Americans also released scant information, concerning what they refer to as “small unmanned aerial systems” that “continue to be spotted in the vicinity of and over Royal Air Force Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, RAF Feltwell and RAF Fairford since Nov. 20…” and that “to date… none of the incursions impacted base residents, facilities or assets.”
Comments have also included:
“The number of systems has fluctuated, and they have ranged in sizes and configurations. Our units continue to monitor the airspace and are working with host-nation authorities and mission partners to ensure the safety of base personnel, facilities and assets. We request individuals in the area to contact either local police or Security Forces if they see anything suspicious, to include sUAS's [suspicious unmanned aerial system] or drone activity.”
USAF Security Forces have also been directly supported by British units. Personnel from the RAF Regiment, which provides tactical security support, were reportedly deployed with counter-drone systems to affected bases, together with imposition of increased restricted airspace.
Interestingly, the Washington Examiner ran a story about UK Special Forces being deployed to Lakenheath, telling Liberation Times the source was “solid.”
The article also indicated the involvement of the Air Force Office Of Special Investigations, which has detachments at four UK sites including Mildenhall, who work closely with RAF Police counter-intelligence and security, together with the MDP and local police forces. Given the national security considerations, it is highly probable that MI5 was consulted.
Lord Coaker stated to the House of Lords:
“The Gold Command [police lead investigative agency] for the sites in East Anglia is the Ministry of Defence Police. That force has the ability, knowledge and expertise to deal with some of the threats.
“His question demonstrates the need for the Ministry of Defence Police to work closely with Home Office police forces [regional police Special Branch] and other agencies [RAF Police counter-Intelligence and Security and U.S. AFOSI] to defend those sites.”
This statement clearly indicates to the author of this piece – who has experience in assessing and investigating national security threats to UK bases – including genuine UAP activity – that the perpetrators are human – and not something exotic – otherwise – the lead agency would be RAF Police counter-intelligence and security officers and their AFOSI counterparts.
Sky News quoted a USAF spokesperson as saying:
"Since November 20 there has been no impact to residents or infrastructure and [they] have not been identified as hostile.”
Another report however, quoted a witness claiming to have seen a “drone” brought down. The witness further stated that others on social media had also seen it.
To date, no validated imagery or confirmation of this incident has been made public.
If true, then one would expect exploitation of the technology to determine the source.
These events come as the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) plans to field non-kinetic anti-drone options to limit collateral damage at key installations and critical infrastructure after a rash of recent drone activity.
The use of directed energy microwave weapons, missiles and other ballistic weapons, have limitations due to air operations around bases and the potential to affect civilians.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a statement and fact-sheet as to its future counter-drone strategy. The fact-sheet states:
‘Enabled by growing commercial innovation and the increasing sophistication of artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, and networking technology, unmanned systems are fundamentally changing how militaries of all sizes, capacities, and capabilities – as well as non-state actors – achieve their objectives.”
‘At the operational level, these systems are making it more difficult for forces to hide, concentrate, communicate, and manoeuvre. They allow adversaries to more easily surveil, disrupt, or attack our forces, assets, and installations, potentially without attribution. At the strategic level, unmanned systems provide aggressors with the ability to reduce the initial human, financial, and reputational costs of conflict. The relatively low-cost, widely available nature of these systems has, in effect, democratized precision strike.”
‘Technological advances in the mid- to long-term will likely render unmanned systems increasingly capable, affordable, autonomous, and networked – able to loiter for longer timespans, to communicate better with other systems, move and act as swarms, and to carry larger payloads. These dynamics risk eroding deterrence and creating new and uncertain escalation dynamics.
‘To stay ahead of advances in unmanned systems – and their growing prevalence – the Department will prepare for more advanced challenges, pacing our future capabilities to more stressing cases (e.g., larger numbers of increasingly capable and autonomous systems).’
The malign actors: Liberation Times spoke to a former UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) electronics expert who supported the RAF maintaining and repairing classified aircraft systems for over two decades and now works for a company providing hardware and software for autonomous public transit infrastructure globally.
He told Liberation Times:
“It would be relatively easy for a malign actor inside UK to source and buy the kit necessary to construct advanced drones – whether buying new or second-hand kit – all of which is easily available.
“Any reasonably capable person would be able to assemble and mount the [electronic] boards and build an advanced drone. All you would need are a soldering iron, a screwdriver and a certain level of expertise. The tricky part, would be the integration of AI to enable the swarming tactics and autonomous behaviour we´ve seen at UK and US bases; that would require a next-level of expertise.”
German company Helsing has unveiled a new one-way attack drone which is expected to be sent to Ukraine:
“HX-2 is an electrically propelled x-wing-precision munition with up to 100 km range. Advanced on-board AI enables full electronic warfare and jamming resistance, capabilities developed and tested through Helsing’s extensive experience in Ukraine.
“When operating as part of Helsing’s Altra recce/strike software, multiple HX-2s can assemble into swarms, controlled by single human operators. HX-2 is designed from the ground up to be software-based, mass-producible, and swarm-capable... HX-2 is providing autonomy through software and AI - while retaining full human control and oversight. Electronic warfare had threatened to erode the ability to act, and we are giving this ability back to operators.”
Asked who he believed were responsible for the UK drone incursions, the former UK Ministry of Defence electronics technician replied:
“Russia one-hundred percent. They have the technical and electronic expertise to mount this type of operation – whether using long-range drones from an off-shore location [adjacent to the bases] – or using agents in place to build and launch the drones inside the UK.”
One UK academic and drones expert Professor David Dunn, concurs with the Russia assessment.
In a recent podcast, he makes some very pertinent observations with which this author concurs:
“It's disruptive first of all; its demonstrating and signalling vulnerability and capability and it´s also about preparation and signalling that preparation. This is not just one or two drones like in Gatwick airport a few years ago. This is a coordinated incursion by a whole variety of different drones that are clearly part of a plan by a sophisticated actor.
"As well as being disruptive, it's sending a signal saying: 'We have the capacity to actually put assets over your most sensitive air bases where you operate your most sophisticated and strategically important aircraft for the defence of Europe through NATO, and we have the capacity to fly over and both disrupt your air operations to actually identify those assets.’"
He stated that the drones are: “operating over B52 bases, over F35 and F-15 bases and it's actually showing a capacity to hit those things on the ground.”
He states that apart from the drones' ability to take detailed photographs of the NATO aircraft, they can potentially be used as offensive weapons to disable them.
Professor Dunn assesses the incursions as “could be” linked to Ukraine's use of British-made Storm Shadow missiles against Russia.
“And we think it's Russia… has the capability, so it's signalling capability but also demonstrating and signalling preparation.. not only have we got the capability, but we're also as part of these incursions preparing to actually exercise that capability by going after your assets and that can take a variety of forms.
“I think the nature of the incursions is particularly interesting in that regard. So it's operating over B52 bases over the F35 and F-15 bases and it's actually showing a capacity to hit those things on the ground but they also went to RAF Feltwell, which is a married quarters.. that's particularly sinister, because it's not just saying we have the capability to go after the aircraft, it's showing that we have the capability to spy on to record to gather information gather intelligence and demonstrate capability to go after the personnel who operate on that air base and in particular the air crew that operate those systems, because these are highly stealthy aircraft.. they are ones that that are housed in hardened aircraft shelters.. so in many ways, the most vulnerable part of that network of operations is when the crews go home to their families in the evening.
“So if these drones are following these crews over the married quarters identifying where the air crew go, identifying where they live, identifying where the children go to school, that's demonstrating a willingness to potentially go after the families or the individual personnel.”
And there is the crux.
Some speculation has been about why the drones would be so obvious and visible with lighting and that if the drones were on an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission, they would seek to avoid detection.
This is missing the point entirely.
Russian intelligence operations – especially by the GRU – are often intended as psychological operations in addition to other activities like spying.
The psychological aspect of the drone incursions is exemplified by the comments of Lord Stirrup, a former Chief of the Air Staff (head of RAF) and Chief of the Defence Staff between 2006 and 2010, when he asked Lord Coaker in the Lords:
“This is not just a question of defence sites but of much wider national resilience. We have seen the extensive use of drones in Ukraine against non-military targets. Can the minister reassure the House that the government will look at this problem in that much wider context, because quite clearly, we can’t mount air defence systems around every single part of our critical national infrastructure.”
Another British academic, Doctor Mark Galeotti, a published expert on Russia and Russian organized crime, has highlighted the relationship between what he terms Russian-based organised crime (RBOC), Russian intelligence agencies and other criminals associated with them, who are not necessarily Russian-speaking. He calls this nexus the “Crimintern.”
He adds:
“Russian-based organised crime groups in Europe have been used for a variety of purposes, including as sources of ‘black cash’, to launch cyber-attacks, to wield political influence, to traffic people and goods, and even to carry out targeted assassinations on behalf of the Kremlin… Professionals adept at moving people and goods across borders are valuable to intelligence operations.. the capacity of RBOC specifically to smuggle weapons and military equipment must be of particular use to the Kremlin.”
“What makes RBOC a particularly serious and timely challenge is the growing evidence of connections between such criminal networks and the Kremlin’s state security apparatus, notably the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), military intelligence (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB).
“Organised crime groups have already been used by the Kremlin as instruments of intelligence activity and political influence are likely to become an even greater problem as Russian’s campaign to undermine Western unity and effectiveness continues.”
A recent bust of a multi-billion-pound international money laundering network highlights the nexus between organised crime and Russia´s intelligence services. According to the UK´s Telegraph:
“The system also helped fund Russian spies in other countries, as well as assisting individuals and organisations seeking to bypass sanctions imposed following Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.. The Russian state uses the networks to fund espionage operations, while they also help sanctioned individuals get cash into other countries.”
Professor Dunn suggests the ability of Russia to use criminal assets in the UK that are plausibly deniable, hypothesising that RBOC in place in the UK - and not necessarily Russian-speaking – could be used to source , assemble and operate drones under remote, deniable direction of Russian SVR (foreign intelligence service) or GRU – Russian military intelligence.
Former UK MoD civil servant Nick Pope hit the nail on the head when he stated:
“Adversaries (probably Russia or China) might use drones to gather data on this, in parallel with using other intelligence-gathering strategies. But they’d be unlikely to risk an intelligence officer (either declared, let alone a highly prized illegal) on something like this.”
The context: Russia´s GRU and intelligence services have an established history of lethal and other UK operations – most notably the 2018 Skripal episode where the Russian Novichok nerve agent was deployed on UK soil. Another Russian operation was the 2006 assassination by radiation poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko – both targeting former Russian intelligence officers who had defected.
Another victim was Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, stabbed on a London street in 1978 by an umbrella with an alleged ricin pellet supplied by the KGB.
More recently, two British men were charged with assisting a foreign intelligence service after a March fire at a Ukrainian-owned warehouse in London.
Across Europe, there have been numerous recent Russia-attributed or otherwise hostile activities before and during the drone incursion timeline, with carrying out a sabotage campaign largely by proxy, recruited local amateurs for everything from arson attacks to acts of petty vandalism, designed to complicate the flow of weapons to Ukraine, affect public support for Kyiv and signal to NATO states that their military, strategic and commercial infrastructure, personnel and assets are not safe.
This comes as Russia threatens to deploy Oreshnik hypersonic missiles to Belarus and lowers its threshold for nuclear use.
There was an unattributed drone incident in restricted airspace in Liverpool in the vicinity of one of Britain´s aircraft carriers in the UK, following another drone incident involving the UK´s other aircraft carrier days earlier in Hamburg, Germany.
The Irish Naval Service recently escorted a Russian naval vessel out of its waters where critical energy pipelines and data cables connect Ireland with Britain. The Russian vessel was operating in both British and Irish waters.
This comes as Russia is stepping up its hybrid or “shadow warfare” activities in the Baltic Sea and the possible involvement of Chinese vessels with sabotaged undersea cables.
Suspected Russian sabotage attempts against U.S. and Canada-bound aircraft using incendiary devices have led Lithuania´s government to call for a “NATO response.”
This comes with claims of hostile activity targeting a Norwegian airbase in the Baltic sea, earlier repeat drone activity at a Swedish nuclear plant and a Russian national arrested for flying a drone in the vicinity of Sweden´s royal palace.
Germany´s BND intelligence chief says that Russian acts of sabotage may require NATO to invoke Article Five – which entails collective defence.
Under Article 5, if a NATO member comes under attack, all the other members of the alliance are obliged to respond.
Bruno Kahl said he expected Moscow to increase its hybrid warfare. He stated:
“The extensive use of hybrid measures by Russia increases the risk that NATO will eventually consider invoking its Article 5 mutual defence clause.. At the same time, the increasing ramp up of the Russian military potential means a direct military confrontation with NATO becomes one possible option for the Kremlin… We don't have any indication yet that Russia intends to go to war, but if such sentiments gain the upper hand in the government in Moscow, then the risk for a military confrontation will grow over the coming years."
Germany, like other NATO members, is well-acquainted with Russian activities after a foiled plot to assassinate the CEO of Rheinmetall – a major German arms manufacturer earlier this year sending artillery shells and armoured vehicles to Ukraine, one of a series of Russian plans to assassinate European defense industry executives supporting Ukraine’s war effort .
In April, two German-Russian nationals were arrested on suspicion of plotting sabotage attacks, including against U.S. military facilities. In August, there was an alert at a German main operating airbase of NATO´s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet.
In June, French authorities arrested a suspect with an explosive device in his room and believed to be part of a sabotage campaign orchestrated in Moscow targeting European countries.
Romania’s constitutional court has just rejected election results after Russian political interference in the NATO state that hosts U.S. troops and is vital to supporting Ukraine.
The same happened next door in Moldova – a non-NATO but Western-oriented state sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine and with over three decades of Russian influence attempts against it.
None of the above will be surprising to students of longer-term Kremlin tactics pre-dating the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – the third invasion of Ukraine if we count Crimea in 2014 – and the follow-on war in the Donbas.
Russia figures heavily in recent speeches by senior British defence, intelligence and security figures. The Chief of Defence Staff mentioned Russia twenty-six times in a RUSI lecture in early December.
In late November, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service made a number of interesting comments in Paris highlighting the Russia threat, stating:
“We have recently uncovered a staggeringly reckless campaign of Russian sabotage in Europe, even as Putin and his acolytes resort to nuclear sabre-rattling, to sow fear about the consequences of aiding Ukraine, and challenge Western resolve in so doing… SIS and DGSE [French] intelligence has been critical to calibrating risk and informing the decisions of our respective governments… France and Britain are united and unflinching in our determination to support Ukraine, for as long as it takes, to defeat Russia’s war of aggression, and protect European security and the international order… Our allies in northern and eastern Europe are sharing their expertise from their long and bitter experience as Russia’s neighbours.”
In October, Ken McCallum – Director Geral of MI5 – the UK´s counter-intelligence and security service, gave a threat update:
“Russia continues its illegal attempt to subjugate Ukraine. While the Russian military grinds away on the battlefield, at horrendous human cost, we’re also seeing Putin’s henchmen seeking to strike elsewhere, in the misguided hope of weakening Western resolve.
“Over 750 Russian diplomats have been expelled from Europe since Putin invaded, the great majority of them spies. This goes well beyond all historical precedent – and has put a big dent in the Russian intelligence services’ ability to cause damage in the West…The more eye-catching shift this year has been Russian state actors turning to proxies for their dirty work, including private intelligence operatives and criminals from both the UK and third countries.
“While altering MI5’s detection challenge, Russia’s use of proxies further reduces the professionalism of their operations, and – absent diplomatic immunity – increases our disruptive options.”
He singled out the GRU saying:
“The UK’s leading role in supporting Ukraine means we loom large in the fevered imagination of Putin’s regime, and we should expect to see continued acts of aggression here at home.
“The GRU in particular is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets: we’ve seen arson, sabotage and more. Dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness. And having precisely the opposite effect to what the Russian state intends, in driving increased operational coordination with partners across Europe and beyond.”
In May, Adrian Bird, Chief of Defence Intelligence, delivered another RUSI lecture, assessing that: “Russia will remain the greatest threat to the UK mainland out to 2030.”
Conclusion: if there is an exotic / UAP lesson to be learned here, it is that given the prevalence of contemporary drone sightings over strategic military and critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities, then the presence of UAP could inject an even more destabilising dynamic between nuclear-armed and nuclear-aspirant actors at a period of high international tensions, from Europe to the Middle East, to the Koreas, the Indian Sub-continent and the Pacific.
All nuclear protagonists should refer to the 1971 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war, that states that arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from incidents including “detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems.”
In the meantime, while the recent spate of UK drone incursions appears to be over, for the time being, they are likely to continue to be a tool in Russia’s hybrid warfare box.
You can read Liberation Times’ previous coverage of the drone incursions here.
Franc Milburn is a former UK Defence Intelligence officer with a background in counter-intelligence and security operations in hostile environments. Past taskings include identifying threats and risks to UK military bases – extractives – including drones – and providing security advice. He has three decades of military and commercial intelligence, investigative and security experience, including Fortune 500, FTSE 100 and government clients. He is an established UAP think tank analyst and a member of the Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies.
