Is A Pentagon Spokesperson Attempting To Avoid Congressional UFO Legislation?
Written by Christopher Sharp - 5 January 2022
Pentagon Spokesperson Susan Gough has stated that the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Office (provided within NDAA 2022) and AOIMSG are the same entity
Gough also seemed to confirm AOIMSG would remain within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security OUSD(I&S), although this is by no means certain
OUSD(I&S) has been widely blamed for previous Pentagon UAP failures
The language within the NDAA would seemingly disqualify OUSD(I&S) from controlling line organizations investigating UAP incidents
The NDAA language lends itself better to an operational office, as opposed to an oversight office, which the OUSD(I&S) is.
The ink had barely dried on President Biden’s NDAA 2022 signature before the warning signs emerged from factions within the Pentagon.
On 29 December, writer Roger Glassel corresponded with Department of Defense (DoD) spokesperson Susan Gough regarding NDAA language requiring the establishment of an Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Office.
And within the correspondence, Gough seemed to confirm that the Office would sit within its Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG).
The AOIMSG upon its establishment in November 2021, had been widely panned by UAP transparency advocates, including Christopher Mellon, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
The Group would sit within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security (OUSD(I&S)), an oversight Office.
That Office had been blamed for previous UAP incidents not being reported up the chain of command and to Congressional committees responsible for national security.
The AOIMSG (as it currently stands) differs extensively from the NDAA UAP language. It lacks the many comprehensive measures, including:
No reference to UAP being transmedium - the Group would concentrate on airborne phenomena, ignoring any ocean and perhaps space activity (note, when pressed on this by Liberation Times, Susan Gough stated she could not comment)
No requirement for the development and implementation of a plan for collection and analysis
No application to incidents that occur outside of Special Use Airspace
No reference to unclassified public briefings
No study into the physiological impact of UAP, which could indeed be impacting military personnel
No provision for the recruitment of contractors or civilian experts
No requirement to consult foreign nations
No requirement to examine technical issues, such as non-combustion propulsion
No accountability or explanation required for agencies that withhold UAP data
No mention of the threat posed to nuclear assets, which may represent an urgent national security risk
No requirement to provide unclassified findings to Congress.
Liberation Times contacted Susan Gough to gain more clarity regarding the DoD’s current intentions, and here is what we found out.
The AOIMSG IS The UAP Office, According To Gough
To be clear, the UAP Office (cited within NDAA 2022) and the widely criticized AOIMSG are now the same entity, according to Susan Gough.
Gough had strongly suggested that fact in her email to Glassel. And she has now confirmed it outright to Liberation Times, declaring:
“There will be only one office – the Airborne Object Identification & Management Synchronization Group.”
This move was to be expected, and something Liberation Times predicted last month when we stated:
“The best immediate course of action that opposition factions can take is to disband the AOIMSG, which would be eclipsed and rendered meaningless when the new UAP Office is established, not to mention a waste of taxpayer money and resources.
Of course, the DoD may try to save face by somehow incorporating AOIMSG into the new Office or vice versa, before gradually disbanding the newly created Group.
The Sec Def has the authority to instruct the USAF and other entities to cooperate. This would be in everyone’s best interest, especially with the IG monitoring the situation.”
Admittedly, it is not inevitable that AOIMSG’s name will change. And if DoD insiders against transparency continue to resist, we can expect AOIMSG to remain, in name at least.
AOIMSG WILL Remain Within The OUSD(I&S), An Oversight Office
From our understanding, AOIMSG will remain within the OUSD(I&S).
"There are no plans to move AOIMSG to any other organization within the DoD or both the DoD and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)."
The above statement was provided by myself to Gough, who did not answer my question directly when asked if AOIMSG will be situated within the OUSD(I&S).
Gough simply referred me to Avril Haines' (the DNI) November 2021 memo regarding the Group's establishment.
Now, that is not a direct response. A simple “yes”, or “yes, and this will remain the case as per the November memo”, would have been better and easier. This suggests Gough didn’t want to confirm anything directly in writing.
So, instead, I simply inferred what my understanding was, reading between the lines. I added: “correct me if wrong, but that's what I am reading.”
As of now, my own statement has not been corrected by Gough. Admittedly, it can not be certified 100% if this is the DoD or ODNI’s intention. Gough has simply not directly commented on this matter or corrected my statement yet.
Just how the OUSD(I&S), an oversight office, can comply with the NDAA, which lends itself better to an operational office, is unclear.
Former Director of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), Lue Elizondo, has previously criticized the involvement of OUSD(I&S), stating:
“Please, please, please contact your representatives and let them know this is unacceptable and not in the best interest of the American people. The USDI is the one single office that has continuously lied about this topic and persecuted whistleblowers.”
In an open letter published in November, Christopher Mellon was scathing of OUSD(I&S), writing:
“As a former OSD staffer myself, I'm shocked that the DepSecDef would assign the UAP function to an oversight staff with no UAP funding, line authority, contracting, command, or technical capabilities. Indeed, the inability of USDI to engage effectively on the UAP issue is why so little has changed or been accomplished since 2004.”
Christopher Mellon
But despite complaints and barriers, it seems (according to Gough) an attempt is underway to incorporate NDAA language within AOIMSG and by default OUSD(I&S).
Regarding this process, Gough stated:
“The Department will take necessary steps to comply with any enacted legislation….As you may recall, we’ve been developing implementing guidance for the AOIMSG. We’re now working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) on implementing guidance to ensure that the AOIMSG meets congressional intent. We have nothing else to announce at this time.”
In other words, Defense Secretary, Lloyd Austin, and Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines and their respective staff, as per the NDAA language, may currently be coordinating to ensure AOIMSG reflects the will of Congress.
That is not possible though if AOIMSG remains wholly within OUSD(I&S).
For instance, the language within the NDAA would disqualify OUSD(I&S) from controlling line organizations, which would investigate UAP incidents.
The following definition is provided for ‘line organization’ within the NDAA language:
“The term ‘‘line organization’’ means, with respect to a department or agency of the Federal Government, an organization that executes programs and activities to directly advance the core functions and missions of the department or agency to which the organization is subordinate, but, with respect to the Department of Defense, does not include a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.”
That rules out any component of OUSD(I&S) being involved, as it would mean any line organization being subordinate to a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
OUSD(I&S), as an oversight office, is incapable of undertaking all responsibilities required by Congress.
Former AATIP Director, Lue Elizondo, speaking about his experiences with UAP
It should also be noted that OUSD(I&S) has no contracting ability, which would be crucial to the success of AOIMSG - that is something previously stated by Mellon.
However, an oversight function may still be necessary and OUSD(I&S), can play a role as an administrative hub.
An easier approach would be to sidestep the Office of the Secretary of Defense completely and take another route provided within the NDAA, allowing for a joint organization of the DoD and the ODNI. Of note, it has previously been suggested that Space Force could lead UAP efforts from within the DoD.
In short, OUSD(I&S) suffers from the following weaknesses:
Alleged history of obfuscating the UAP issue
No contracting ability
No operational function
Unable to oversee line organizations as per NDAA language
No technical capabilities, as stated by Mellon
Can Congress really trust any information and briefings that originate from such an office?
A Dangerous Game
Gough did not answer all of Liberation Times’ questions directly or clearly.
In total, we had seven questions, which were numbered in the initial email. In Gough’s initial response, not all questions were answered. So, we re-sent the questions, highlighting which ones were not answered.
Even that was not enough, as Gough then stated that two questions were not applicable, as they had referred to the NDAA UAP Office and AOIMSG as two separate entities, This meant rewording the questions to get a direct answer.
That is not good practice and comes across as evasive in nature.
With Congress and the Inspector General watching events unfold closely, those who have been accused of obfuscation are playing a dangerous game.
Of note, Gough would not comment on any UAP coordination between the U.S., its foreign allies, and partners until “guidance for AOIMSG is approved”.
One could imagine that those in Congress will be bemused to read the word guidance when the NDAA lists requirements.
But there is no way around it. The new version of AOIMSG must comply with the NDAA, otherwise those responsible will be breaking the law.
Whatever happens, time is not on their side.
The first deadline, under the NDAA bill, is a classified briefing for the armed services and intelligence committees no later than 90 days after enactment, meaning no later than March 2022.
Notes:
Comments so far have come from the DoD, not the ODNI
Liberation Times asked Gough if queries to ODNI regarding AOIMSG should be redirected to herself - Gough requested that we contact ODNI directly - we have done so but have received no response yet.
Liberation Times Opinion